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I.

INTRODUCTION

There is little to no historical antipathy between China and
Africa or China and Latin America. The issue is not merely whether
China is a neo-colonial power (it is)3 but rather how colonial and
post-colonial legacies facilitated China’s rise and continued
welcomed presence in specific regions. This article adds to the
literature by arguing a parochial focus on China’s neo-colonial
practices, without more, misses a larger point. By failing to locate
and properly contextualize colonial and post-colonial trauma,
Western powers––the U.S. in particular-–will continue to be
confounded why authoritarian China is embraced in Africa and
Latin America. Beijing’s engagement with both regions is
multifaceted. Its lack of an unfriendly, aggressive, or colonial past
allows it to masquerade hardline neo-colonial strategies as mutually
beneficial policies for economic partnership and growth. China has
a compelling story that sells well in Africa and Latin America. It
survived harsh colonial regimes, internal chaos, and extreme
poverty only to emerge an economic and socio-political juggernaut.
But the China presented to the world is a mirage; its true nature is
found in the horrors of Xinjiang concentration camps, privacy3

See AT Editor, Is China the Neocolonial Power in Africa?, AFRICA TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://africatimes.com/2019/10/27/is-china-theneocolonial-power-in-africa/.
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erasing digital state surveillance models, the Hong Kong
crackdown, intellectual property theft by state-sponsored
companies, and debt trap diplomacy. Beijing does not often reveal
its true intentions. “Wolf-warrior” diplomacy is a rare instance of a
Chinese Communist Party mistake. The Belt and Road Initiative is
less an infrastructure and telecommunications project, albeit on a
massive scale, than it is a hortatory expression of 21st century
Chinese global hegemony. The Belt and Road Initiative will not
make the world more egalitarian, secure, or free. Only the U.S. can
counter Chinese aggression against ethnic and political minorities
within China and against unfair trade practices and technology
inequity internationally. However, a slick post-colonial lexicon is
insufficient to explain to Africa and Latin America why, sooner or
later, they will reach a point of no return with China. The U.S. must
first reckon with the BLM movement against systemic racism and
its international COVID-19 response before regaining the necessary
moral authority to counter China on the world stage.

II.

CHINA IN CRISIS

A. The Chinese Context
China is in trouble. Beijing’s harsh realpolitik is exposed on the
world stage: the continuing human rights tragedy in Xinjiang,4 the
unprecedented crackdown on freedom in Hong Kong,5 its
negligence and obfuscation in the face of the Covid-19 global
pandemic,6 its dangerous aggression and provocation against India,
4

See Maya Wang, More Evidence of China’s Horrific Abuses in Xinjiang but
Little Action Holding Beijing Accountable, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 20,
2020, 1:32 PM) (detailing human rights abuses at the Chinese government’s
“political education” camps for religious Muslim minorities),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/20/more-evidence-chinas-horrific-abusesxinjiang.
5
Grace Tsoi & Lam Cho Wai, Hong Kong Security Law: What is It and is It
Worrying? BBC News, June 30, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiachina-52765838.
6
James Schultz & Sean Carter, China Needs to be Held Accountable for Covid19’s Destruction, CNN, June 20, 2020,
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a fellow nuclear power, along the contested Himalaya border
region,7 the eternal cyber breaches commissioned by China against
both the U.S. public and private sectors to include the Presidential
election and coronavirus vaccine research,8 heightened awareness
and concern regarding China’s ubiquity in the global
telecommunication and technology sectors,9 high-profile allegations
that China is using apps especially popular with younger people,
such as TikTok and WeChat, for nefarious spying and privacyinvasion purposes,10 not to mention longstanding smoldering
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/20/opinions/china-needs-to-be-held-accountablefor-covid-19s-destruction/index.html (summarizing Associated Press reports that
the Chinese government concealed critical facts about the virus, silenced
whistle-blowers, which likely deprived the world of information regarding the
virus’ transmissibility and lethality).
7
James Griffiths, India and China are Squaring off in the Himalayas Again.
How Worried should we be?, CNN (Sept. 2, 2020, 2:48 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/02/asia/india-china-himalayas-border-intlhnk/index.html; see also James Griffiths, India’s Modi Responds to ‘Violent
Face-Off’ with China over Himalayan Border, CNN (June 18, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/17/asia/china-india-himalayas-conflict-intlhnk/index.html.
8
Tim Starks, Russia, China and Iran trying to Hack Presidential Race,
Microsoft Says, POLITICO (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/10/russia-china-iran-cyberhack-2020election-411853; see also Eric Geller & Betsy Woodruff Swan, DOJ Says
Chinese Hackers Targeted Coronavirus Vaccine Research, POLITICO (Aug. 21,
2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/21/doj-chinese-hackerscoronavirus-research-375855.
9
Sherisse Pham, New Sanctions Deal ‘Lethal Blow’ to Huawei, China Decries
US Bullying, CNN (Aug. 18, 2020, 11:25 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/17/tech/huawei-us-sanctions-hnk-intl/index.html.
10
See generally, Zak Doffman, Warning –– Apple Suddenly Catches TikTok
Secretly Spying On Millions of Iphone Users, FORBES (June 26, 2020, 1:46
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2020/06/26/warning-applesuddenly-catches-tiktok-secretly-spying-on-millions-of-iphoneusers/?sh=16931c7234ef; see also Nikki Carvajal & Caroline Kelly, Trump
Issues Orders Banning TikTok and WeChat from Operating in 45 Days if They
Are Not Sold by Chinese Parent Companies, CNN (Aug. 7, 2020, 7:26 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/06/politics/trump-executive-ordertiktok/index.html; see also Tim Wu, A TikTok Ban Is Overdue, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 18, 2020, 11:25 AM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/opinion/tiktok-wechat-ban-trump.html.
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tensions such as Chinese military expansion in the disputed South
China Sea region.11
China transformed itself in record time from a nation mired in
poverty to an internationally recognized great power. Scholars are
unsure how to qualify China’s success; some hold it is a neocolonial power while others perceive it as a necessary counterweight
to perceived U.S. economic and political hegemony.12 The fact
China is not on a path to liberalism means the pendulum in
Washington has swung in the last two decades or so from a
consensus approach supporting engagement with China to a less
flexible stance with calls for intense competition and even
containment of China in a new ‘cold war.’13 China’s ability to be
flexible and opportunistic undoubtably aided its rise;
notwithstanding its classical Marxist roots, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) is fully capable of embracing aspects of capitalism
while maintaining stringent communist ideological precepts. In
political scientist Yuen Yuen Ang’s view, “directed improvisation”
and not state control is the reason behind China’s economic
miracle.14 If that is true, China’s economic miracle somewhat more
a leap in the dark. In either event, China’s political and economic

The TikTok and WeChat controversy belies a consequential struggle: two
dueling visions of the internet. The older U.S. perspective believes the internet
should connect everyone in neutral fashion and that censorship by nation-states
should be rare. In contrast, China is the world’s leading proponent of “net
nationalism,” an idea that the internet is primarily a tool of state control. In this
perspective, the internet’s essential functions are economic growth, surveillance,
and thought control.
11
The Editorial Board, China’s Claims to the South China Sea are Unlawful.
Now What?, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/27/opinion/pompeo-south-china-sea.html.
12
Carmen G. Gonzalez, China in Latin America: Law, Economics, and
Sustainable Development, 40 ENV'T L. REP. 10171, 10171 (2010) (“Others
applaud China’s unorthodox development strategies and portray China as a
successful model for developing countries and as a welcome counterweight to
U.S. economic and political hegemony.”).
13
Jessica Chen Weiss, A World Safe for Autocracy? China’s Rise and the
Future of Global Politics, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July/Aug. 2019),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-06-11/world-safe-autocracy.
14
Id.
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models are not suitable for export.15 Authoritarian-minded leaders
may look with envy at CCP-type controls but find it difficult to
emulate the Chinese system.16 China’s distinct authoritarianism
comes from a discrete socio-historical context. In the third decade
of the twenty-first century, the CCP maintains domestic power, in
part, due to a robust and almost unimaginably expensive internal
security apparatus that by 2011 cost more than the Chinese
military.17
B. Behind the Wolf
On July 23, 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a
speech titled “Communist China and the Free World’s Future”18
wherein he detailed a paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy and
detailed the CCP’s designs for global hegemony:
What do the American people have to show now 50
years on from engagement with China? … We
opened our arms to Chinese citizens, only to see the
(CCP) exploit our free and open society . . . . Perhaps
we were naive about China’s virulent strain of
communism … or hoodwinked by Beijing’s talk of a
“peaceful rise.” Whatever the reason … China is
increasingly authoritarian at home, and more
aggressive in its hostility to freedom everywhere
else… the only way to truly change communist
China is to act not on the basis of what Chinese
leaders say, but how they behave… I’ve met with
Uyghurs and ethnic Kazakhs who escaped
Xinjiang’s concentration camps. I’ve talked with
Hong Kong’s democracy leaders, from Cardinal Zen
to Jimmy Lai… The challenge of China demands
15

Id.
Id.
17
Id.
18
Michael R. Pompeo, Communist China and the Free World’s Future, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE (July 23, 2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/communist-chinaand-the-free-worlds-future-2/index.html.
16
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exertion, energy from democracies – (including)
those in … Africa … (and) South America …”19
In recent years, as China attained first-rate power status, it
switched to a more aggressive style of diplomatic messaging termed
“wolf-warrior diplomacy.”20 The new approach appears popular
within China, at least among hardline nationalists and CCP
devotees, and breaks with the more measured, temperate, traditional
Chinese style of international engagement.21 The evocative term
comes from a 2015 Chinese domestic blockbuster. The film quickly
spawned a sequel, Wolf Warrior 2, complete with the jingoistic
tagline “[e]ven though a thousand miles away, anyone who affronts
China will pay.”22 Produced with a $31 million budget, Wolf
Warrior 2 tells the story of a Chinese special forces veteran who
successfully battles American mercenaries and defends Chinese
interests around the world.23 The film grossed $810 million in China
but only $2 million in North America.24 Chinese state media took a
shine to the term and began using it to describe Beijing’s
increasingly bombastic and combative diplomatic language. Wolfwarrior diplomacy is most often aimed at U.S. spokespersons and
refutes self-defined spurious charges against Beijing. For instance,
a common wolf-warrior diplomatic refrain denies any notion China
is responsible for Covid-19.25 According to China’s Foreign
Minister Wang Yi, China’s policy is akin to a self-defense measure
because China never picks a fight or bullies others but will push
back against any deliberate insult, resolutely defend its national

19

Id.
Ben Westcott & Steven Jiang, China is Embracing a New Brand of Foreign
Policy. Here’s What Wolf Warrior Diplomacy Means, CNN (May 29, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/asia/china-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-intlhnk/index.html.
21
Zhiqun Zhu, Interpreting China’s ‘Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy,’ THE DIPLOMAT
(May 15, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/interpreting-chinas-wolfwarrior-diplomacy/.
22
Westcott & Jiang, supra note 20.
23
Taylor Shortal, Hollywood’s Red Dawn: China’s Restrictions on American
Film, 2 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 208, 212 (2018).
24
Id.
25
Westcott & Jiang, supra note 20.
20
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honor, and counter slander with facts.26 The shift in tone came
directly from the top; President Xi Jinping issued an edict to
diplomats in 2019 exhorting them to show more “fighting spirit” in
their international engagements.27
Wolf-warrior diplomacy is a misstep; China is conflating an
ability to indulge in acts of braggadocio with the capacity to garner
meaningful international esteem. Its hawkish, often misleading
statements are landing flat abroad.28 For all its global aspirations,
China remains a remarkably inward-facing country. The punitive
twentieth century casts a long shadow over the weltanschauung of
Beijing. That China continues to showcase a tin ear is seen in the
promotion of two of its most vocal proponents of wolf-warrior
diplomacy: Foreign Office Minsters Hua Chunying and Zhao Lijian.
Beginning in 2018, the pair launched a series of baseless conspiracy
theories against the U.S. and the West. More recently, they mocked
national responses to the coronavirus pandemic and the Black Lives
Matter (BLM) movement.29 Zhao Lijian in particular seems to
embody China’s restless and malcontented diplomatic posture. His
efforts are not particularly successful. After peddling a conspiracy
theory that the U.S. Army may have intentionally brought the
coronavirus to Wuhan, the city at the epicenter of the Covid-19
outbreak, Twitter “slapped its fact-check icon” on his text and
publicly scorned his assertions.30 More interesting still is Zhao
Lijian’s venture into racialized messaging. Following international
condemnation of China’s repression of its Uyghur minority
26

Id.
Keith Zhai & Yew Lun Tian, In China, a Young Diplomat Rises as Aggressive
Foreign Policy Takes Root, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-diplomacy-insight/in-china-a-youngdiplomat-rises-as-aggressive-foreign-policy-takes-root-idUSKBN21I0F8.
28
Alexandra Ma, China’s New, Hardline ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomacy is
Supposed to Cement Its Dominance – but It’s Also Uniting Its Rivals Abroad
and Dividing People at Home, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 27, 2020, 4:12 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-backfiresuniting-rivals-dividing-at-home-2020-6.
29
Id.
30
Isobel Asher Hamilton, Twitter Fact-Checked a Chinese Government
Spokesman After He Suggested the US Brought COVID-19 to Wuhan, BUS.
INSIDER (May 28, 2020, 7:23 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/twitterfact-checks-china-government-spokesman-2020-5.
27
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population, Zhao wrote on Twitter “[i]f you’re in Washington, D.C.,
you know the white never go to the SW area, because it’s an area
for the black and Latin. There’s a saying ‘black in & white out’,
which means that as long as a black family enters, white people will
quit, & price of the apartment will fall sharply.”31 Zhao’s tweet was
roundly criticized outside China and he quickly deleted it.32 He
nonetheless followed up with a subsequent Twitter message noting
racial and ethnic segregation patterns of living in Washington D.C.33
Given the combination of Zhao’s rise and the CCP’s endorsement
of wolf-warrior diplomacy, it appears likely Chinese diplomats will
engage in further instances of race-baiting.
The U.S. would do well to recognize wolf-warrior diplomacy
has more to do with Chinese insecurities than it is an expression of
international primacy. Shi Yinhong, a professor of international
relations, explained in a May 2020 webinar that China’s aggressive
remarks failed to adequately acknowledge complex global realities
and were delivered “too hastily, too soon and too loudly in tone.”34
Instead of burnishing China’s international image and placating
those who may blame China for Covid-19, the wolf-warrior
diplomats were undermining China’s credibility while needlessly
provoking other countries.35 It may be that wolf-warrior diplomacy
31

Huizhong Wu, Move Over Trump: China’s Tweeting Diplomats Open Fresh
Front in Propaganda Fight, REUTERS (July 16, 2020, 4:10 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-diplomacy-internet/move-over-trumpchinas-tweeting-diplomats-open-fresh-front-in-propaganda-fightidUSKCN1UB0MQ.
32
See Wendy Wu, Is It Time for China to Leash Its Wolf Warrior Diplomats,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 12, 2020) (detailing how other Chinese
ministers have faced similar levels of opprobrium. In Paris, ambassador Lu
Shaye was summoned by the French foreign office to answer for comments on
his embassy website asserting France had left its citizens to die of coronavirus in
aged care homes.),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3097134/it-time-chinaleash-its-wolf-warrior-diplomats.
33
Huizhong Wu, supra note 31.
34
Wendy Wu, supra note 32.
35
Minxin Pei, China’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomats Are Being More Reckless
Than Donald Trump. That’s a Mistake. That’s a Mistake, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST (June 13, 2020, 2:00 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3088462/chinas-wolf-warriordiplomats-are-being-more-reckless-trump-thats.
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is a historic mistake.36 The U.S. must avail itself of China’s error. If
nothing else, wolf-warrior diplomacy is a clinic in how to frustrate
consensus-building. It is the antithesis of ordered messaging. The
U.S. should go in the complete opposite direction and treat the
nations of the world with candor and respect. To do otherwise risks
America’s ability coordinate and lead the free world at a critical
juncture in history.”37

III.

STATE-SPONSORED DOMESTIC TERROR

A. Hong Kong
The increasingly interconnected world means China
sometimes cannot easily hide its appalling abuses.38 The call for
human rights protections in China is nothing new, although there are
increasing signs the need is becoming acute.39 The fact that
President Xi Jinping has overseen a deterioration in human rights
coinciding with a rise in his own power had led some analysts to
make comparisons to Mao Zedong.40 The U.S. can and should
engage China on its deplorable human rights record. Following
China’s repression in Hong Kong, President Trump signed the Hong
Kong Autonomy Act41 which stripped the city of its special trading
36

See generally Alexander Downer, Why China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy is a
Historic Mistake, FIN. REV. (July 13, 2020, 12:00 AM),
https://www.afr.com/world/asia/why-china-s-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-is-ahistoric-mistake-20200712-p55b93.
37
Id.
38
See, e.g., Donie O’Sullivan, Twitter Deletes China-Linked Account that
Spread False Information about Hong Kong and Covid-19, CNN (June 12,
2020, 7:19 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/11/tech/twitter-manipulationaccount-removal/index.html.
39
Margaret K. Lewis, Human Rights and the U.S.-China Relationship, 49 THE
GEO. WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 471, 478 (2017).
40
Id.
41
Andrew Restuccia & Lindsay Wise, Trump Signs Hong Kong Sanctions Bill,
Pivots to Criticizing Biden, THE WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-signs-hong-kong-sanctions-bill11594762613.
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status with the U.S. The measure was necessary due to a new
security law imposed by Beijing, which meant Hong Kong was no
longer sufficiently autonomous from China to justify special
treatment.42 Essentially, the security law undermined Hong Kong’s
autonomy and increased the risk of sensitive U.S. technology and
intellectual property being illegally diverted to unauthorized end
users in China and elsewhere.”43 Speaking of the Hong Kong
Autonomy Act, President Trump asserted that the law provided his
administration with the necessary tools to hold responsible the
individuals and entities that extinguished the flame of freedom in
Hong Kong.44 In his address, President Trump equated the
devolution in Hong Kong civil rights and liberties with a newfound
inability to compete in free markets.45 If President Trump is correct,
China’s determination to continually oppress peoples will have
longitudinal real-world economic consequences.
B. Tragedy in Xinjiang
Beyond the imposition of a police state in Hong Kong, recent
events in Xinjian, China’s westernmost province, ought to shock the
world’s conscience and bring condemnation upon China for human
rights abuses against the Uyghur ethnic minority. Xinjiang,
officially the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is home to
approximately 11 million Uyghurs, a predominantly Muslim ethnic
42

James Griffiths, US-China Relations Are at an All-Time Low, but Trump Still
Seems Unsure How to Handle Beijing, CNN (July 17, 2020),
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/16/asia/us-china-trump-relations-intlhnk/index.html. On July 14, 2020, President Trump signed Executive Order
(EO) 13936, The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization.
The President's Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization, 85 FR 43413.
43
BIS Final Rule Suspends EAR Hong Kong Preferential Treatment, 62 No. 30
The Gov’t Contractor ¶ 227 (Aug. 12, 2020),
https://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/News/GOV'T%20CONTRACTOR.pdf.
44
Morgan Chalfant, Trump Signs Bill Imposing Sanctions on China Over Hong
Kong, THE HILL (July 14, 2020, 5:48 PM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/507341-trump-signs-bill-imposingsanction-on-china-over-hong-kong.
45
Id.
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minority that speaks a language similar to Turkish and has a unique
culture.46 Uyghur history is complex. The territory was the
easternmost edge of the medieval Islamic Empire.47 During the tenth
century, the population converted to Islam from Buddhism and
Christianity. Many centuries later, in 1759, the Manchus invaded
their domain and “blanketed the area with colonial non-Muslim
administration and limited the Islamic authority to a secondary
position.”48 In the twentieth century, various governments imposed
regulations to further isolate the Uyghurs from Islam. In the 1970s,
however, China implemented its open-door policy49 and enabled the
Uyghurs to restore their mosques, organize Hajj pilgrimages, and
attend Islamabad universities to study Islam.50 An Islamic
renaissance flowered from 1978 to 1988 but Beijing came to view
these developments as a threat to state secular authoritarianism.
Forbidden for decades to practice Islam, the Uyghurs have since
been subjected to Chinese coercion methods, including the depiction
of Uyghur resistance as international terrorism.51 Since 2016, China
interned at least one million Uyghurs in concentration camps it
euphemistically calls “reeducation centers” or “vocational training
and education centers.”52 In actuality, the centers are concentration
camps, designed to brainwash Uyghurs and force them to abandon
their heritage and religion.53 The detainees are abused, tortured,
46

Nectar Gan, et. al., What’s Been Happening in China’s Xinjiang, Home to 11
Million Uyghurs?, CNN (June 19, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/19/asia/xinjiang-explainer-intl-hnkscli/index.html.
47
Caprice L. Roberts, Rights, Remedies, and Habeas Corpus-the Uyghurs,
Legally Free While Actually Imprisoned, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 12 (2009).
48
Id.
49
Deng Xiaoping transformed modern China when he created a new “open
door” policy to attract foreign capital and businesses. See generally, Guocang
Huan, China’s Open Door Policy: 1978-1984, 39 JOURNAL OF INT’L AFFAIRS, 1,
1-18.
50
Roberts, supra note 47.
51
Id.
52
See Bill Bostock, China is Forcibly Sterilizing Uyghur Women and Giving
Them Unwanted Abortions in a Mission to Purge the Muslim Minority, Report
Says, BUS. INSIDER (June 29, 2020, 7:47 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-forcibly-sterilizing-uighur-womenxinjiang-abortions-contraception-ap-2020-6.
53
Id.
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raped, and murdered.54 China is sterilizing Uyghur women and
forcing them to undergo unwanted abortions in an attempt to
eradicate the group.55 China’s campaign against the Uyghurs meets
the suppression of birth criteria set forth by the United Nations
Convention for the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of
Genocide.56 As one female Uyghur said in stark terms about China’s
genocidal aims: “[t]he Chinese government wants to control the
Uyghur population and make us fewer and fewer, until we
disappear.57 Proof of China’s inhumane treatment of the Uyghurs
arrived on America’s shores in 2020 when eagle-eyed U.S. Customs
and Border Protection agents seized 13 tons of product made from
human hair suspected of being forcibly removed from Uyghurs
imprisoned in concentration camps.58 The grisly discovery is further
evidence of China’s maintenance of a massive network of
concentration camps in Xinjiang, where the Uyghur prisoners are
subjected to a continual range of horrors.59
C. High-Tech Surveillance

54

Rayhan Asat & Yonah Diamond, The World’s Most Technologically
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Not content with twentieth-century-style concentration camps,
China is hard-wiring Xinjiang for segregated surveillance.60
Applying military style cyber capabilities to civilian control, the
Chinese government created a “virtual cage” that complements the
physical concentration camps in Xianjing.61 To enable surveillance,
Xinjiang operates under a grid management system: municipal
centers are divided into squares of about 500 people and each square
has an assigned police unit that monitors inhabitants by regularly
scanning their identification cards, faces and bodies, DNA samples,
and cell phones.62 In the Uyghur city of Kashgar, the police rely on
an app to flag people exhibiting suspicious behavior, such as
atypical smartphone use, avoiding the front door, coming and going
from home or refueling someone else’s vehicle.63 Human Rights
Watch claims the government’s arbitrary power is reflected in the
app which is designed “to consider vague, broad categories of
behaviors, many of them perfectly legal, as indicators of
suspiciousness.”64 Wang Lixiong, a Chinese author who has written
about China’s surveillance state in Xinjiang explains that the “goal
here is instilling fear – fear that their surveillance technology can
see into every corner of your life.”65 The company behind the
technology is the China Electronics Technology Group Corp., or
CETC, a state-owned defense contractor.66 China began its intense
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Uyghur surveillance program in 2013.67 By hacking into Uyghurowned smartphones and embedding tracking software on apps that
hosted Uyghur-language news, Uyghur-targeted beauty tips, and
religious texts like the Koran, the Chinese government monitored
the whereabouts of purported enemies of the state around the
world.68
D. Opportunity Wasted
On June 17, 2020, President Trump signed the bipartisan
Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act.69 The Act is intended to hold
Chinese officials accountable and imposes sanctions on foreign
individuals and entities responsible for human rights abuses in
Xinjiang. Additionally, the statute requires reports to Congress on
several topics, including the Chinese government’s acquisition and
development of technology to facilitate internment and mass
surveillance. So far so good. Yet undermining the significant moral
dimensions of the law were a series of bombshell allegations leveled
at President Trump by his former National Security Advisor John
Bolton. In his bestselling book,70 The Room Where It Happened: A
67
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58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 232, 236 (2019) (describing how China shows no
sign of stopping research on technological surveillance programs, including
facial recognition software that helps officials determine a person’s current
emotional state).
68
Mozur & Perloth, supra note 67.
69
Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-145, 134 Stat.
648. Additionally, in July 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced
new sanctions against China for Uyghur human rights violations he dubbed “the
stain of the century.” Laura Kelly, U.S. sanctions Chinese officials, paramilitary
agency over Uighur abuses, THE HILL (July 31, 2020, 3:21 PM),
https://thehill.com/policy/international/510024-us-sanctions-chinese-officialsparamilitary-agency-over-uighur-abuses.
70
John Bolton’s memoir sold over three quarters of a million copies in its first
week of sales. Brian Stelter, John Bolton’s memoir has sold a staggering

16

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

White House Memoir, Bolton insists President Trump told President
Xi Jinping he endorsed Beijing’s Uyghur concentration camps.71
Bolton noted that “Trump said that Xi should go ahead with building
the camps, which he thought was exactly the right thing to do …
which meant we could cross repression of the Uyghurs off our list
of possible reasons to sanction China, at least as long as trade
negotiations continued.”72 By President Trump’s own admission, he
initially prioritized the making of a trade deal with China over
punishing Beijing for mistreating the Uyghurs.73 President Trump’s
detractors insist this was no one-off as his record, in their view,
shows a selective approach to human rights issues; regions where
President Trump is looking to “make a deal” are unlikely to face
sanctions.74 For their part, China hawks privately expressed
frustration because they believe President Trump did not need The
Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act because the Global Magnitsky
Act already provided him with the authority to impose U.S. lawful
entry and property sanctions against any foreign person or entity for
reasons including extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.75 From this
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perspective, the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act was perhaps less
an expression of President Trump’s hardline stance against Uyghur
oppression and more a measure by Congress to press sanction.76

IV.

GREAT POWER COMPETITION

A. Threat Vectors
The 2018 National Defense Strategy made clear China is now
the primary U.S. national security concern.77 China is determined to
fashion a “world-class” military.78 The U.S. risks losing strategic
advantage to China across several critical domains.79 For instance,
China is poised to surpass the U.S. in gross domestic product (GDP)
while gaining technological advantages in critical scientific research
areas, including artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing,
advanced battery storage and semiconductor technologies,
genomics and synthetic biology, fifth-generation cellular networks
(5G), and robotics.80 The differences between the U.S. and China
are stark and the consequences for the world should China prevail
are grave. The U.S. aspires to create a “free and open” world,
complete with respect for sovereignty and the independence of
nations, peaceful resolution of disputes, fair and open trade,
76
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adherence to international law, greater transparency and responsible
governance.81 By contrast, China’s global vision is largely illiberal,
whereby Beijing sets the economic and military order and nations
fall in line.82 If China triumphs, the world will be poorer for it;
nations under China’s sphere of influence will be characterized by
weak civil society and a cancerous authoritarianism bolstered by
China’s surveillance state.83
China is likewise a threat to U.S. private sector interests.84 In
2012, former NSA Director Keith Alexander famously declared that
Chinese hacking efforts into U.S. industrial and intellectual property
constituted “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.”85 As Vice
President Mike Pence explained in 2018:
[T]o win the commanding heights of the 21st century
economy, Beijing has directed its bureaucrats and
businesses to obtain American intellectual property
… the foundation of our economic leadership by any
means … and using that stolen technology, the
Chinese Communist Party is turning plowshares into
swords.86
To provide a comprehensive defense against Chinese hacking,
the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act provided that the U.S.
81
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will employ all instruments of national power to defeat malicious
cyber events.87 Nonetheless, most detected Chinese cyber
operations against U.S. companies are directed against cleared
defense contractors and information firms whose products and
services support government, as well as private sector networks.88
Estimates vary, but according to the Ponemon Institute, the average
malicious cyber event cost U.S. companies $7 million in 2017.89
Costs can quickly skyrocket, depending on the scale of the cyber
event in question; the Equifax breach reportedly cost its insurers
approximately $125 million.90 The Chinese private sector has its
sights on U.S. industry secrets too. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
(Huawei) is but a single example. Headquartered in Shenzhen,
China, Huawei is the nation’s largest telecommunications
manufacturer and the world’s second-largest manufacturer of
smartphones, with over $90 billion in revenue in 2017 alone.91
Suspicion regarding Huawei dates back at least to 2012, when the
House Intelligence Committee issued a report concluding that
Huawei was a national security threat due to its wanton disregard
for U.S. intellectual property laws.92 It is remarkable Huawei is
unremarkable; in China Huawei is not an exception because, like
any major company, its lines of business are supplicative to the
CCP.93 In 2018, during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing,
87
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FBI Director Christopher Ray testified that Beijing might use
Huawei’s immense, global telecommunications infrastructure to
compromise U.S. security interests.94 As a result, in August 2018,
Congress passed the 2019 NDAA and section 889 codified a ban on
Huawei.95 The difficulty is that, what made Huawei a possible threat
vector, its necessary close association to the CCP, makes all Chinese
telecommunication companies similarly tainted. For instance, in
April 2020, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman
Ajit Pai, made a compelling case against ZTE, another Chinese
telecommunications giant. In his remarks, Pai said the U.S. will not
allow the CCP to exploit network vulnerabilities and compromise
critical communications infrastructure.96 On June 30, 2020, the FCC
voted unanimously to designate ZTE and Huawei as national
security threats, thus cutting them off from billions of dollars in
federal broadband subsidies.
It is particularly concerning when U.S. technology companies
capitulate to CCP talking points and are complicit in silencing
speech. In June 2020, Sen Josh Hawley (R-MO) condemned the
conferencing app Zoom for eroding its principles when it shut down
the accounts of U.S.-based Chinese activists who held an event on
the platform commemorating the 1989 anniversary of the
Tiananmen Square Massacre.97 Zoom temporarily suspended the
account of Zhou Fengsuo, the director of the nonprofit Humanitarian
China, subsequent to his hosting a Zoom meeting with
approximately 250 users remembering the massacre of antiCommunist protestors by Chinese government personnel. In a
statement defending its action, Zoom acknowledged Zhou
Fengsuo’s account was suspended because “when a meeting is held
across different countries, the participants within those countries are
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required to comply with their respective local laws.”98 Chinese law
forbids discussion of Tiananmen Square. In his letter to Eric Yuan,
Zoom’s chief executive, Senator Hawley admonished Zoom for
choosing censorship over free speech and using the convenience of
Chinese “local laws … are what Party officials use to oppress more
than a billion people, including more than one million Uyghurs who
have been forced into slavery.”99 Hawley concluded his letter on an
ominous note: “Trading American values for Beijing profits never
ends well.”100
B. BRI: The Foreign Policy Vision
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the centerpiece of
Beijing’s foreign strategy.101 In 2013, China mobilized vast
resources and spearheaded a massive infrastructure development
program; in its words, it began creating a modern Silk Road.102 The
BRI includes over 125 countries and almost half of the world’s
GDP.103 The BRI is creating a land, sea, and telecommunications
network connecting China with much of the rest of the world104––
yet, it is so much more than a trade route. It is a “mega strategic
initiative,” a “going-global strategy,” a “geo-economic vision” from
the world’s second largest economy, biggest exporter of goods, and
third largest investor for two-thirds of the global population.105 The
BRI’s foundational normative blueprint, the Vision and Actions
statement, co-authored by China’s National Development and
Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of
98
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Commerce, exhorts countries along the BRI to promote “unimpeded
trade.”106 The tone of the Vision and Actions statement is
noteworthy and pledges Beijing will work “to build a community of
shared interests, destiny and responsibility, featuring mutual
political trust, economic integration and cultural inclusiveness.”107
The BRI is a marketing campaign at heart.108 In 2017, President
Xi Jinping gave an address at the Belt and Road Forum where he
addressed the BRI’s five main goals: policy coordination, facilities
connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial connectivity, and people to
people bonds.109 China funds the projects via credit lending or
“debt-trap diplomacy” – a predatory scheme aiming to hook poor
countries Chinese loans.110 Since the BRI’s launch, Chinese banks
have given hundreds of billions of dollars in loans to participating
countries.111 Debt-distressed and low-income nations, fearing its
governments are falling into “debt-traps” which may threaten
national security, have relied upon Public-Private Partnerships
(PPP) using Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) models to finance BRI
projects.112 When developing a PPP via a BOT, the public authority
grants a concession right to a private sector entity or sponsor to
develop an infrastructure facility; the entity is responsible for
financing, building, and operating the facility for a specified time.
At the end of the specified time, the project hopefully should have
generated sufficient profits to cover project costs, repayment of debt
principal, and promised return on investor equity. At this point, the
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facility is transferred to the public authority free of charge.113 Not
surprisingly, these speculations about the future are often wrong,
giving rise to the “debt trap” designation.114 A few countries see
China’s debt practices for what they are: a form of neo-colonialism.
In 2018, Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad announced
his country was canceling two multibillion dollar BRI projects
because Malaysia could not pay its debts and “[w]e do not want a
situation where there is a new version of colonialism.” It appears
this and other high-profile BRI failures are teaching China to be
more cautious of reputational risk factors. China is currently
instituting a course correction and the government now publishes
foreign investment guides.115

V.

COLONIALISM

A. The Colonial Encounter
More than two hundred years ago, colonialism was packaged
and sold to the world as a benign, civilizing mission for the benefit
of peoples of color in Africa, Latin America, North America, India,
Australia, and Asia.116 Trade was a primary driving force of colonial
expansion.117 Doctrines were written to provide trading companies
like the British East India Company and the Dutch East India
Company quasi-sovereign rights over indigenous peoples. Company
113
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charters provided the right to trade in specific areas and the ability
to take certain political action, like coining money or starting a
martial campaign against indigenous peoples.118 By the nineteenth
century, European states assumed direct responsibility for colonial
lands.119 For instance, in 1858, the British East India Company was
dissolved to make way for British colonial rule. This change entailed
a critical shift in the ideology justifying Empire in terms of
commodities to a new, sterner language of order, hierarchy and
governance. The new approach was articulated at the Berlin
Conference,120 during 1884-85, when European colonial powers
divided indigenous lands in Africa.121 Critically, too, the Berlin
Conference acted as a pressure valve for inter-European rivalries;
for example, African lands were exchanged and bartered to ease
Continental politics.122
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B. The Creation of ‘Race’
Race is a social construct. Indeed, race operates solely as a social
construct and was a critical method of defining ‘the other’ in
colonial contexts.123 As notions of race are responsive to the needs
of power elites, its social construction and concomitant expressions
of racism alter from time and place. Writing in 1856, leading
transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote about the
significance of race as caste, a type of social predestination
segregating the elect and non-elect: “race … puts the hundred
millions of India under the dominion of a remote island in the north
of Europe.”124 Over a century ago, American sociologist W.E.B. Du
Bois studied the problem of the creation of ‘race.’ He was
profoundly troubled race was getting substituted as a biological
explanation for what he knew to be social and cultural differences
amongst people.125 Mainstream science today wholeheartedly
embraces W.E.B. Du Bois’ views.126 As one leading scientist of the
human genome put it, “[t]he more we learn about humankind’s
genetic differences … the more we see that they have almost nothing
to do with what we call race.”127 As ‘race’ is a social construct,
racism is born from social legacies of oppression.128 Further, ‘race’
was a useful concept to colonizers; it was a metric of
differentiation.129 Colonizers pointed to the differentiation to
123
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support myriad horrors, including violent assimilation policies,
socio-religious indoctrination, and the brutalization of indigenous
bodies.130
C. Colonialism in Africa
The colonial state in Africa was extant less than a century in
most cases.131 Yet the effects of colonialism are lasting and
profound, not least because the practice created arbitrary territorial
boundaries while reordering political spaces, modes of economic
production, and exploiting societal cleavages.132 According to
historian Michael Crowder, the portrait of Africa painted by the
colonial powers was one of a people who, on the eve of occupation,
were politically decentralized, living in small enclaves, dominated
by unscientific fears of the natural world, and living in perpetual fear
of attack.133 Thus was born the fantasy that Africa required Europe
to save it.134 The voracious rapidity of the so-called “Scramble for
Africa” was astounding: in half a generation, Europe gained
virtually an entire continent that included ten million square miles
of new territory and 110 million subjects.135
Perhaps nowhere in Africa was the colonizer’s avarice on
display more than the Congo. For most of the nineteenth century,
Belgium’s Parliament remained indifferent to colonial enterprise.136
The Belgian royal family, however, relished colonial ambitions.
Leopold I, father of the infamous Leopold II of the Congo, knowing
outright conquest of Africa was impossible, set about purchasing
130
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large swaths of territory.137 He had a good historical model in
President Thomas Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase, accomplished
scant decades earlier. Leopold I failed numerous times. He could not
buy Guatemala, Crete, Fiji, the New Hebrides and even a part of
Texas which the United States acquired after the Mexican-American
War.138 When Leopold I died in 1865, Leopold II ascended the
Belgian throne and continued his father’s work of empire.139 He was
determined, as he put it, to get “a slice of this magnificent African
cake.”140 Leopold II created ruses whole cloth to gin up support for
his enterprise; for instance, he was the chief proprietor of an
organization whose stated purpose was saving African souls from
Islam.141 Highly regarded throughout Europe as the “philanthropic”
monarch, he welcomed Christian missionaries to the Congo.142 His
soldiers found acclaim in Continental newspapers; faded ink on
brittle pages tell triumphal stories of troops battling local slavetraders bent on capturing fellow humans and reducing them to a
price.143 Not to be outdone, Leopold II’s main agent, Henry Stanley,
a notorious self-promoter in his own right, already famous for his
apocryphal greeting, “Dr. Livingston, I presume?”144 depicted the
Congo and its inhabitants as the backdrop for narratives of Whites
bestowing ‘civilization’ and religion to the people of Africa.145
Leopold II first met Stanley in 1878 and in December of that year
Stanley signed a 5-year contract to establish the Congo enterprise.146
Leopold II never visited the region that was his personal fief. The
inaptly named Congo Free State was soon “awash in corpses.”147 It
is estimated Belgium’s exploitation of the Congo reduced the
137
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region’s population by ten million people.148 It is an understatement
to say that during its relatively brief existence between 1885 and
1908, the Belgian Congo was the situs of unspeakable horrors.
The breakup of indigenous societies under colonial rule was the
subject of Chinua Achebe’s 1958 anti-colonial masterpiece Things
Fall Apart. Achebe was writing, as he often expressed, against the
Africa of Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, that classic work of
colonial apologia.149 In a polemic against Conrad’s depiction of
African peoples, Achebe commented on a few sentences from Heart
of Darkness: “[t]his passage, which is Conrad at his best, or his
worst, according to the reader’s predilection, goes on at some length
… And then Conrad delivers the famous coup de grâce. Were these
creatures really human?”150 Achebe’s Things Fall Apart is a
powerful counterpoint to Heart of Darkness. At the novel’s end, the
reader is left only with the erroneous, bereft musings of a middling
colonial bureaucrat.151 The systemic iniquities described in Things
148
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Fall Apart meant that the transition from colony to successful
nation-state has not been easy for many African countries. After
brutalizing Africans and siphoning the land’s natural resources for
decades, the various colonial powers granted independence to the
scattered nations of Africa without preparing the new rulers to
handle their devastated economies and various ethnic groups.152 In
many instances, the departing colonial powers perpetuated their
abuse of African resources through the imposition of constitutions
which maintained the privileges of the immigrant European
population at the expense of indigenous peoples.153 Apartheid South
Africa is but a single example. Not surprisingly, a fair percentage of
the post-colonial African leaders emulated the savagery of the
colonizers and heaped misery, warfare, poverty, and hunger upon
their own.154
D. Colonialism in Latin America
The nations comprising Latin America came into existence after
the arrival of Europeans to the coastal region of eastern South
America and the Caribbean Islands during the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries.155 When considering the region’s history, it is
important to “face east” and remember Latin America has a history
that stretches back much further in time than the arrival of the
Spanish and Portuguese.156 These colonial societies quickly became
rigidly hierarchical with severely constrained social mobility for
indigenous peoples, peoples of mixed heritage, and persons of
There was so much else to include, and one must be firm in cutting out details.
He had already chosen the title of the book, after much thought: The
Pacification of the Primitive Tribes of the Lower Niger.” See generally, id.
152

Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & Chukwuemeka A. Iheukwumere, Colonial Rapacity
and Political Corruption: Roots of African Underdevelopment and Misery, 3 CHI.-KENT
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2-3 (2003).
153
154

Id. at 3.
Id.

155
Yanira Reyes Gil, Critical Conversations on Nationalism, Self-Determination,
Indigenous People, Globalization and Colonialism: Reflections on the South-North
Exchange, 2004 & 2005, 17 FLA. J. INT’L L. [xiii], at xv (2005).
156
See generally DANIEL K. RICHTER, FACING EAST FROM INDIAN COUNTRY: A NATIVE
HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICA (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 2003).

30

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

African descent.157 Hector Meléndez, a scholar of Latin American
history, locates the region’s colonial domination as a collective
wound binding the region together while moving forward through
time.158 Legal historian Francisco Valdés views the Spanish legacy
in Latin America as causing the destruction of native civilizations
and wholesale genocide.”159 Broadly constructed, there were three
overarching stages or epochs of colonial enterprise: (1) 1500 – 1800,
characterized by the transfer of wealth from indigenous societies to
Europe; (2) 1800 – 1950, the continued impoverishment of the
region albeit sometimes directed from inter-Latin power sources;
and (3) 1950 – 1970, dubbed the “neocolonial period” and
characterized by wealth transfer through local development and
export-led industrialization strategies.160
During the early modern period, Latin American colonialism
was rooted in the exploitation of the bountiful natural resources held
by indigenous peoples and the imposition of Spanish-Portuguese
centric values, culture, and religion.161 Violence was a constant
feature of the experience.162 Laying the foundation for the so-called
“Black Legend,” in his Brief Account of the Devastation of the West
Indies, published in 1542, the Dominican Friar Bartolomé de Las
Casas said the following about atrocities the Spanish committed in
Peru:
“After having killed not only all people of rank but
almost all males capable of bearing arms, the
Spaniards subjected the rest … [of the indigenous
peoples] to devilish serfdom and exacted slaves as a
157

KENNETH J. ANDRIEN, THE HUMAN TRADITION IN COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA
2-3 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2d ed. 2013).
158
Gil, supra note 155, at xv; see generally, HÉCTOR MELÉNDEZ, GRAMSCI EN LA
DE DIEGO: TRES ENSAYOS SOBRE CULTURA NACIONAL, POSMODERNIDAD E
IDEOLOGÍA (Ediciones La Sierra 1995)).
159
Gil, supra note 155, at xv.
160
Id. at xvi.
161
Yuri Mantilla, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the Andean Region,
International Law, and Global Economic Integration, 43 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’
L L. REV. 39, 41 (2020).
162
Id.

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

31

tribute . . . . Shiploads of which were sent to Peru to
be sold. Beyond this [the Spaniards] committed so
many murderous deeds and atrocities that an entire
kingdom … which had been one of the most
populous and fertile on earth was utterly
destroyed.”163
The “Black Legend,” a tradition of anti-Spanish criticism, was
popular among European powers from the seventeenth to the
nineteenth centuries not least as an ideological weapon in the
struggle amongst European powers for colonial possessions.164 In
response, Spanish colonial apologists fashioned a “White Legend,”
whereby colonial violence was downplayed and a type of pax
hispanica ended the supposed endemic warfare amongst indigenous
groups.165
The U.S. issued the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. The doctrine held
that the independent republics of the Americas would never be
recolonized and remain free from European intervention.166 The
doctrine’s stated purpose of noninterventionism was not intended
and in fact did not apply to the U.S.167 The Monroe Doctrine was
understood in Latin America as a type of “imperial edict” that had
the twin effect of undermining the sovereignty and selfdetermination of Latin American nations.168 Unlike the European
colonial experience in Africa, U.S. colonialism in Latin America
was not a form of territorial acquisition as much as a particular form
of socio-political domination.169 The arc of history shows the U.S.
expanded its sphere of influence southwards and increasingly
intervened in Latin America to advance, in part, its own commercial
163
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interests.170 These practices reached a crescendo during the
Theodore Roosevelt Administration and his “big stick” approach to
international politics, which granted the U.S. authority to exercise
“international police power” in the Western Hemisphere. One
unintended consequence of the “big stick” approach is that “many
Latin American radicals and nationalists historically have looked
upon the United States as their natural enemy.”171 This perspective,
especially applied to the post-war inter-American relationship,
views U.S. colonialism in Latin America in terms of unequal
treaties, interventionist trade regimes, and overbearing diplomatic
directives.172

VI.

CHINESE NEO-COLONIALISM

A. Mutual Unequal
Africa is changing. Sub-Saharan Africa is urbanizing at the
world’s fastest rate.173 No issue is more central to the ongoing
conversation about Africa’s development than Sino-African
relations.174 Given the decades-long slide of economic decline in
some African regions, China’s appeal is readily apparent.175 China’s
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supporters claim its interests in Africa are apolitical and businessoriented, with a proven track record of generating economic growth
without creating aid dependency. Additionally, some African
intellectuals welcome China’s involvement on the continent as a
marker heralding a return to a multipolar world in which Africa will
have a bigger role to play.176 The reality is that China’s strategy is
self-referential and neo-colonial with strategic economic
asymmetries and a failure or unwillingness to condemn oppressive
African governments.177 In this view, “[t]he interest of China in
Africa is highly suspicious … it is a relationship that should be
handled with caution especially by the African governments …
[because] it mirrors the Euro-African relationship during Europe’s
colonial adventures in Africa.”178
Colonialism, in its raw form, is a socio-political ecosystem
predicated on the subordination of certain association members
while granting the colonizers prerogatives denied to the
colonized.179 China continues to benefit more from Africa than
Africa does from China. However, it is wrong to say that the
evolution of the Sino-Africa relationship is one-way, with passive
Africa responding to Chinese overtures. After all, African people
and governments initiated contact and sought relations with China
before independence.180 Further, post-independence leaders such as
Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere and Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda looked to
China as a model for domestic economic nation building.181 In the
1960s and 1970s, China’s relations with African nations were often
driven by domestic African considerations, as China fashioned itself
for those audiences into a plausible alternative to both the West and
first link between China and Africa. Egypt’s famed Queen Cleopatra reportedly
wore silks that probably originated in China.)
176
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the Soviet Union.182 In the 1980s, during the waning years of the
Cold War, China continued to position itself as an alternative, this
time to the “Washington Consensus” and the devastating structural
adjustment programs sometimes foisted upon Africa. The SinoAfrica relationship entered a new phase in the 1990s with significant
consequences for both sides. China saw Africa as a land of
possibility for growing recognition of its status as a global power,
while Africa understood China as a wellspring of economic
investment.183 In 2000, China and Africa created the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to serve as a method for
promoting cooperation and shared interests.184 That same year,
Beijing hosted a ministerial conference, the first of its kind in the
history of Sino-Africa relations.185 The conference drew over five
thousand attendees and approximately eighty ministers of foreign
affairs, international trade, and economic cooperation from fortyfour African countries.186 China’s interest in Africa continued
apace; 2006 was dubbed “China’s Year of Africa.”187 Bucking
global trends, China took a risk and did not shy away from
investment in Africa during the global financial crisis of 2008.188
More recently, Chinese investment in Africa has extended to
mergers and acquisitions and to the expansion of Chinese-owned
manufacturing operations on the continent.189 Today China’s veneer
in Africa wears thin; there is little doubt it is exporting cheap, low
grade products to Africa, especially in certain markets like textiles
and electronic goods.190
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Africans continue to express a range of reactions to Chinese
engagement. Generally, leaders and governments tend to portray
Beijing in a positive light and point to tangible improvements in
public works projects that benefit ordinary people engaged in daily
life.191 After decades of European colonial dominance, followed by
more decades of Western aid and investment provided under
paternalistic guises, some African leaders have shown appreciation
for China’s “no strings attached” approach.192 Recently, China’s
socialist market economy, driven by state-owned enterprises, is
more brazenly geared toward securing sufficient energy, resources,
and minerals to feed its domestic and international industrialization
programs.193 In 2008-2009, the African Labor Research Network
(ALRN) performed a ten-country study (Angola, Botswana, Ghana,
Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe) and found evidence of a neo-colonialist system,
whereby China profited to the detriment of African economic
systems.194 The relationship, which began more egalitarian, is now
unequal. For this reason, greater numbers of African workers
increasingly refer to “Chinese businesspeople … [as] the new
colonizers.”195 Importantly, some African leaders are taking an
increasingly pessimistic tone and warn that the unfavorable
economic and commercial engagement with China will end
badly.196 Michael Sata, the fifth President of Zambia from 2011 to
his death in 2014, ran campaigns in 2006 and 2011 focused on the
social and economic dangers of African weakness relative to
China.197 President Sata’s fears were prescient: Zambia, Africa’s
third-largest economy, is currently reeling from extensive Chinese
debt, with Beijing playing hardball and looking to restructure
agreements that may involve mining assets as collateral.198 One
191

LARRY HANUER & LYLE MORRIS, African Reactions to Chinese Engagement,
in CHINESE ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA: DRIVERS, REACTIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. POLICY 55 (2014).
192
Id. at 57.
193
Jauch, supra 182.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Hanuuer & Morris, supra note 191, at 55.
197
Id.
198
Elliot Smith, Zambia’s spiraling debt offers glimpse into the future of
Chinese loan financing in Africa, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2020),

36

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

South African commentator who has seen China’s activities on the
continent up close thinks China’s primary goal with foreign
investment is geopolitical, not economic. The problem is ripe for
exploitation because the investments tend to bind African countries
politically to China while creating debt obligations and leverage that
China can manipulate to force nations to support Chinese global
ambitions.199
B. China in Latin America
Modern Latin America is a diverse region, a land of contrasts.
Brazil is massive, occupying half the South American continent with
a population greater than 200 million.200 Mexico boasts the next
highest population at nearly 120 million while Colombia, Argentina,
Peru, and Venezuela constitute smaller nations with populations
between 30 and 50 million.201 Trade between China and South
America is growing exponentially, but this often involves
exchanging short-term economic gains for long-term
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/14/zambias-spiraling-debt-and-the-future-ofchinese-loan-financing-in-africa.html. It is noteworthy that in 2017, the Chinese
media conglomerate StarTimes funded the creation of a migration to a new
digital TV signal and now controls 60% of a joint digital venture with ZNBC.
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dependency.202 Some estimates claim that China will be the
dominant trading partner in Latin America by 2050.203 President Xi
Jinping indicated that the next step in China’s development is
transforming its economy from a labor-intensive export model to
one in which medium and high-skill exports are coupled with
growing material imports to China’s megacities.204 Latin America is
poised to help China pivot away from its current producer-exporter
status because its population of nearly 600 million can support
economic industrialization and serve as a base for Chinese goods.205
At a meeting between China and 33 members of the Community of
Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi said the region was a natural fit for the BRI, as
the U.S. has taken a more proactive stance in the last few years.206
Chile’s Foreign Minister Heraldo Munoz said that China’s
relationship with CELAC marks the beginning of a “historic”
dialogue that represents a categoric repudiation of protectionism and
unilateralism.207 Chinese banks (China Development Bank and
China Export-Import Bank) are the largest lenders in Latin
America.208 Accumulated loans totaled $137 billion from 2005 to
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2019 with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina rounding out
the top recipients.209
Positive impacts to some Latin American economies are coming
at a prohibitive cost in terms of Chinese neo-colonialist
exploitation.”210 For countries like Brazil, a former Portuguese
colony, Beijing is an alternative to Washington’s benign neglect but
the increase of Chinese manufactured goods in the Brazilian market
is concerning to government officials because the real to yuan
currency difference makes it more difficult for Brazilian national
production to compete with cheaper products from China. China has
spent billions of dollars in Latin America in the past fifteen years,
mostly in the form of loans to regional governments for a variety of
projects.211 Trade between China and Latin America surged from
$12 billion in 2000 to almost $306 billion in 2018.212 The loans have
transparency issues and have all the appearance of debt traps.213
China’s growing imprimatur on Latin America can be seen in other
chilling instances. In Quito, Ecuador, Chinese-made CCTV cameras
with facial recognition technology are likely being used for
surveillance and intelligence gathering purposes.214 The Venezuelan
government now relies on Chinese technology for its “fatherland
card,” a type of identity document human rights activists fear will
be used to infringe on privacy. Most of all, China’s exploitation of
the region’s natural resources is leading to environmental concerns
about pollution and harm to residents and livelihoods.215 Chinese
companies do not have high environmental standards and labor
rights are not considered; “[f]or Chinese companies, the community
is not a valid interlocutor, only the government is. The different is
209
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that gringo imperialism deals with civil society, the Chinese don’t
… They don’t try to understand where they are … And they consider
that social peace is not their problem.”216 As Taish Mercedes, a
sixty-five-year-old member of the Shuar minority, an indigenous
group living in Ecuador and Peru, explained her feelings when a
Chinese-backed mining project bulldozed her home in the
Ecuadorean region of the Amazon basin: “[o]ur motherland can
provide us with everything. That is our way of life. But the
colonisers came and taught people how to live with money. … Now
the Chinese are the new colonisers – just like the ones before. They
are ruining the harmony of our land.”217
Washington’s repeated warning to Latin America to be wary of
becoming too economically reliant on China is not having the
desired effect of driving Beijing from the region.218 The reasons are
fairly straightforward from a Latin-centric public-relations
perspective: while the U.S. government imposed a more stringent
tariff regime on Latin American countries, demanded Mexico pay
for a border wall, put undocumented workers at risk for deportation,
and proposed cuts to U.S. aid, China exerted itself and lent many
helping hands to the region. Kevin Gallagher, a China-Latin
America relations professor at Boston University, summed up the
dichotomy which has practical, real-world consequences: “Literally
and figuratively, the [U.S.] is building walls against Latin America
. . . . The Chinese are proposing to build bridges, and they’re
actually doing it.”219 Nonetheless, a Chinese long-term victory in
Latin America is not inevitable. The U.S. has closer cultural,
political, and economic ties with several major nations in the region
than does China.220 U.S. companies, ranging from Chevron to
216
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McDonald’s, have a substantial presence and are actively
collaborating with governments on myriad investment projects.221
Speaking the language of post-colonial uplift, former U.S. Secretary
of State Rex Tillerson said that China’s presence in Latin America
is alarming because the region “does not need new imperial powers
that seek only to benefit their own people.”222 The U.S. needs to be
far more adept at message branding and curtail divisive language:
President Trump threatened to cut off aid to Latin America if they
cannot prevent drugs from coming into the U.S., he added, quite
unnecessarily “[t]hese countries are not our friends, you know.”223
C. Medical Diplomacy
During her virtual speech at the Republican National
Committee, Nikki Haley, the former U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations, was characteristically blunt in her assessment of Beijing’s
responsibility for Covid-19: “Communist China gave us the
coronavirus.”224 This is not China’s first time getting blamed for its
poor response to infectious diseases. During the 2002 and 2003
SARs crisis, China hid cases, censored doctors and withheld
information from the world for months.225 In December 2019,
patients at Wuhan hospitals had pneumonia symptoms that were not
responsive to treatment. Doctors quickly sent samples for genetic
testing and the results revealed a coronavirus similar to SARs; these
same doctors warned the virus was contagious via respiratory
221
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droplets and on surfaces.226 Thereafter, the Chinese government
stepped in. The story about a virulent infection rate was downplayed
in Wuhan and Beijing. Frontline doctors tried to speak up and warn
each other on social media but were silenced.227 In late December,
Dr. Li Wenliang, a courageous whistleblower, was detained by the
police for warning about the virus and “spreading false rumors.”228
He was forced to sign a false official statement admitting to violating
the law and seriously disrupting “social order.”229 Soon after Dr.
Wenliang’s death from the virus, the news of his passing was the
most read topic on Weibo, China’s microblogging site with more
than 1.5 billion views.230 Predictably, the intense public interest in
Dr. Wenliang’s death soon caught the attention and ire of the CCP.
Soon thereafter, the National Supervisory Commission, China’s
most powerful anti-corruption agency issued a chilling one-sentence
on their website: investigators will be sent to Wuhan to conduct “a
comprehensive investigation into the problems reported by the
public concerning Dr. Wenliang.231
Despite multiple layers of culpability for COVID-19, China
determined its most important fight is a public relations battle.232 In
the main, China’s strategy is to pivot away from stories about
COVID-19’s genesis in Wuhan and the subsequent coverup
perpetrated by CCP officials and promote headlines supporting that
China is on the frontlines saving humanity.233 Lin Songtian, China’s
ambassador to South Africa tweeted: “We are doing instead of
talking. We are the friends not enemy. Could the American do the
same to Chinese?”234 It is no accident that a heat map of where
226
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Beijing is sending condolences and medical supplies aligns closely
with nations with a demonstrated willingness to accommodate
China.235 Fake news, misleading spin, obfuscation, concealment,
and hyperbole are hallmarks of the CCP’s coronavirus
propaganda.236 Unlike Russia, with its acrimonious information
operations and election meddling, China’s global propaganda efforts
are usually aimed at promoting China’s virtues.237 From Beijing’s
perspective, the contest is not about who gets to run the U.S. but
rather the world.238 Russia is a second-rate power in its own region.
It is an economically sluggish, oil-dependent nation with an
economy one tenth the size of the U.S. China, by contrast, possesses
an economy poised to overtake that of the U.S. and has sunk billions
of dollars into cultivating global dependence on Chinese
investments and markets.239 As the global pandemic worsened,
Beijing went into propaganda crisis mode. Chinese diplomats, staterun media, and Twitter influencers doubled-down and launched a
frenzied defense, scrambling to preserve the CCP’s cratering
reputation both domestically and internationally.240 Meanwhile,
during the time China ramped up its messaging, the U.S. paused
funding to the United Nations’ World Health Organization
(WHO).241 U.S. allies were stunned by President Trump’s
announcement.242 President Trump shot back his rationale: the
WHO willingly participated in a Chinese-directed cover-up about
the virus.243 As the U.S. appeared disinterested in leading a global
response, China continued its ostentatious pledges of cash to the
WHO and vowed to provide any vaccine discoveries China makes
235
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to the world as a public good.244 On July 7, 2020, President Trump
started the process to withdraw the U.S. from the WHO.245 The
Geneva-based organization, a leader in the fight against myriad
diseases in the Americas, ranging from polio, measles to mental
health issues and COVID-19, receives approximately $400 million
in annual U.S. contributions.246 As the U.S. turned inward to
respond to its own coronavirus crisis, “[f]rom Santiago, Chile to
Mexico City and everywhere in between, America’s leadership is
being called into question and China is positioning itself to carry the
mantle.”247 China carefully crafted its messaging to Latin America
throughout its coronavirus response and is reaping strategic returns.
On April 13, 2020, Argentina’s foreign minister thanked China for
providing a large shipment of much-needed medical supplies. The
aid boxes were emblazoned with the Chinese and Argentine flags
and a quote in Spanish about brotherhood from the renown
Argentine poem “El Gaucho Martín Fierro” by José Hernández.248
Latin America became the epicenter of the pandemic during the
late summer of 2020.249 Multiple leaders including Brazilian
President Jair Bolsonaro, Honduran President Juan Hernandez,
Dominican Republic President Luis Abinader, and Bolivia’s
unelected de facto leader, Jeanine Añez, alongside half of her
cabinet, all contracted the virus.250 The difference between the U.S.
and Chinese approach to the outbreak in Latin America is striking.
The U.S. suspended shipments of personal protective equipment
244
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while China announced $1 billion in loans to nations in the region
to help pay for a vaccine China says it will develop.251 China also
donated hundreds of thousands of masks, testing kits numbering in
the tens of thousands, as well as ventilators and other medical
equipment.252 China’s tactics appear to be working and Brazil is a
case in point. President Bolsonaro ran on an anti-China platform and
blamed China for the virus’ spread. However, after Brazil faced the
second worst outbreak in the world, Bolsonaro reconciled with
Beijing, an about-face almost certainly spurred by Brazil’s power
agribusiness interests, which know China is a customer they cannot
afford to alienate.253
Beijing retained the initiative and took proactive steps each time
COVID-19 swept through a new nation. From Mexico to Argentina
and Peru, nations accepted China’s offers of support.254 At times,
leaders even broadcasted enthusiastic and grateful messages to
China. “Gracias China!!!,” gushed Mexico’s foreign minister
Marcelo Ebrard on Twitter after a plane containing vital medical
supplies arrived from China.255 Not one to waste a political moment,
China amped up its rhetoric about brotherhood in the face of crisis.
As Luo Zhaohui, a senior officer at China’s foreign ministry
declared, “China will ride out the storm with people from other
countries, strengthen cooperation and strive to win the last victory
in the fight against the virus.”256 China’s strategic moves appear to
be gaining traction. While U.S. officials were criticized for the
unhelpful branding of COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus,” Beijing
acknowledged the continued gratitude and praise coming from Latin
America.257

VII.

251

CONCLUSION: AMERICAN PROTEST, GLOBAL FREEDOM

Id.
Id.
253
Id.
254
Garrison, supra note 218.
255
Angelo & Chaves, supra note 247.
256
Garrison, supra note 218.
257
Garrison, supra note 215.
252

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

45

America is having a moment. The nation was founded on
dissent and countless Americans have channeled anger into action,
from the Colonial-era tax revolts that sparked the American
Revolution, the labor, housing and busing protests that defined the
1960s civil rights movement, to the modern era and the #Me Too
Movement.258 In the proud tradition of American dissent, the Black
Lives Matter (BLM) movement began in 2013 after twenty-eightyear-old George Zimmerman was acquitted of criminal charges after
fatally shooting seventeen-year old Trayvon Martin in Sanford,
Florida.259 In protest, three Black women started the BLM
movement using the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter to stop societal
devaluation of the lives of peoples of color.260 The next year, in
2014, two additional Black men were killed by police officers –
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri and Eric Garner in New York
City. Videos of their deaths went viral on social media and further
galvanized calls for police accountability.261
On May 25, 2020, George Floyd was asphyxiated in police
custody after a Minneapolis police officer knelt on his neck for 8
minutes and 46 seconds.262 His death-struggle and desperate cries to
“mama” for help, caught on tape, shocked the nation.263 According
to Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arradondo, Derek Chavin, the
former officer who killed Floyd, knew what he was doing because
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he had taken specific training on preventing asphyxiation.264 George
Floyd’s name will likely go down in history besides Rosa Parks and
Emmet Till. Prior to Floyd’s death, the highest estimate for any
American protest, the 2017 Women’s March, was 4.6 million. Polls
show that in the summer of 2020, as many as 21 million adults
attended a BLM or police brutality protest. America is realizing that
society too often has turned to law enforcement to address
challenges faced by Black communities when police response is
inadequate: “[y]ou don’t have schools that function well; you don’t
have teachers that get paid; you don’t have hospitals in some
communities . . . . This creates the kinds of conditions that make
people feel like police are necessary, but the solution is to actually
reinvest in those things that give people a way to live a good life . .
. .”265
Before America can change how Africa and Latin America
perceive it vis-à-vis China, America must itself change. Historian
Tyran Steward captured something of the sentiment of the age when
he noted that social justice demands, such as changing the name of
the Washington football team, were once nonstarters but are actually
happening.266 Police accountability bills honoring George Floyd
were introduced on the House floor,267 companies are now
recognizing Juneteenth, the oldest known holiday honoring
slavery’s end in the U.S. and giving employees a paid day off from
work to observe it,268 the state of Mississippi is coming to terms with
264
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its racist history and changing its flag,269 monuments to Confederate
Generals are toppling,270 and the National Football League is
supporting the right of its players to kneel during the National
Anthem.271 Covid-19 has played a dual role in the protests’
momentum: the pandemic kept people home, with more time on
their hands to consume news of Floyd’s death at the hands of
police.272 The coronavirus “exposed the interconnectedness of
human vulnerability, which provides a new lens through which …
[to view] Floyd’s killing … [and] unveiled the way in which we are
all interrelated and haptic.”273
The U.S. must act now to emerge victorious in the coming global
showdown with China. Woe to the world if America does not seize
this moment. The U.S. must embrace competition with China.
Beijing is brutalizing the Uyghurs and extinguished freedom in
Hong Kong. Its “wolf-warrior diplomacy” is remarkable, not for its
success, but rather for how it showcases China’s contempt for much
of the world. Its surveillance state is frightening. It is true China’s
story is remarkable. It emerged from the rubble of the mid-twentieth
century to become a great power. But China needs Africa and Latin
America to sustain its growth. Most importantly, Beijing, merely by
not being the West, inherits post-colonial goodwill even as it creates
neo-colonial effects in those same regions. BRI is no mere building
program; it is the very vision of a Chinese global tomorrow. At first
it may appear China has the upper hand; 2020 was a year of infamy
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in America: the pandemic, an overdue reckoning with America’s
original sin of racism, and extreme partisan politics have left many
scars. Yet the factors that divide may also unite. If the U.S., together,
can meet this moment, the world may have a new rebirth of freedom.

